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Abstract
This paper uses a multinomial probit model to analyze individuals’ choice of banks based
on the types of banking services they use, their own characteristics, and their own perceptions
about important factors in banking. Previous studies on this topic, which are limited in
number, concentrate on the U.S. where financial markets are deep. This analysis uses a
unique individual level data set from a nation-wide survey implemented after the 2001 crisis
in Turkey, of which one major component was bank failures. Hence, it provides the first
set of evidence on the topic in an emerging market context. The study groups banks into
three categories: public banks, large private banks and small private banks, among which
the latter is perceived to be the potentially risky group. Investigating individuals’ choice
among these three types, the paper uncovers that while individuals tend to prefer small
private banks on the basis of high interest rates, they tend to avoid them on the basis of
trust. However, higher branch density and closeness negatively affect the choice of small
private banks. Additionally, individual’s choice of public banks as opposed to large private
banks seems to have been positively influenced mostly by being older, being retired, receiving
salary/pension, and valuing special services for farmers and craftsmen while it seems to have
been negatively influenced by the use of certain services, valuing friendliness of the staff, and
living in more developed regions where there is variety in terms of the financial institutions.
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1 Introduction
Turkey experienced a number of financial crises since the 1980s when the attempts of financial
liberalization started. Although liberalization was underway, a sound financial system was never
in place until after the 2001 crisis when severe measures were taken to regulate the financial
sector. While a number of bank failures due to bad banking practices occurred during the
period, what is perhaps the most striking is that many individuals nonetheless chose to work
with banks that have potential risks, partly thanks to full deposit insurance which was in effect
prior to 2001.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the factors that contribute to individuals’ choice of banks
by using a unique data set based on a nation-wide survey implemented after the 2001 crisis in
Turkey.1 The analysis builds up on a multinomial probit model where banks are categorized
into three: public banks, large private banks and small private banks, based on ownership type
and asset holdings of the banks. State involvement in the banking sector in Turkey initially was
in terms of establishing banks for specific purposes: agricultural credits, housing credits, credits
for tradesmen and craftsmen, etc. Later the operations of those banks exceeded the original
intention. In addition, most state employees receive salaries and all retirees receive pensions
from state banks. In light of the developments in the Turkish banking sector–of which a brief
overview is below–small private banks category can be perceived as including banks that carry
potential risks. The paper thus investigates the effects of various individual level characteristics,
including the usage of different banking services, on individual choice of banks.2
As Alper and Onis (2004) point out, the 2001 crisis in Turkey, in which both public and
private banks played an active role, is an example of a combination of a weakly supervised and
under-regulated banking system and a sudden macroeconomic crisis.3 They state that in Turkey,
similar to other emerging market economies like Mexico or Argentina, a transitional financial
system is observed, the key feature of which is the lack of sound regulations and institutions.
Thus, crises generated by bank failures may have harmful consequences for the real sector.
Specifically, Alper and Onis stress the importance of three issues that outline the developments
1The banks in Turkey are universal banks: they provide both commercial and investment banking services.
2Note that as the data set of this paper is at individual level, the choice of banks by businesses is left out, and
hence the paper provides a partial analysis of the demand side of the banking sector.
3For a detailed account of the 2001 crisis in Turkey see, for example, Alper (2001), Alper and Onis (2004),
and Gencay and Selcuk (2005). For a detailed account of the developments in the Turkish economy from different
perspectives, see Ertugrul and Selcuk (2002), Metin-Ozcan et al. (2001), Ismihan et al. (2005), Onis and Rubin
(2003) and references therein. A series of articles in Kibritcioglu et al. (2002) provides a detailed analysis of
inflation dynamics and disinflation efforts in Turkey. More recent studies on Turkey include Celasun et al. (2003),
Selcuk and Ardic (2006), and Ardic and Selcuk (2006).
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in the Turkish banking sector in the 1990s. First, the considerable degree of the presence of
public banks in the system had negative consequences for the economy. Second, new entry in
the sector was almost entirely based on political factors. Third, foreign presence in the Turkish
banking sector was negligible. It is therefore possible to note that the banking system was indeed
in a vulnerable position by the end of the 1990s.4
In the context of these developments, it is important to note that a large number of individ-
uals nonetheless continued to work with smaller banks that carried potential risks. Specifically,
as of June 2001, 10% of total deposits in Turkey were held by failed banks whose controls were
handed over to the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF hereafter).5 The SDIF was estab-
lished after the 1994 crisis and was entitled full deposit insurance. The presence of full deposit
insurance created an obvious moral hazard problem: individuals went on with entrusting poten-
tially risky banks with their life-time savings in the hopes of getting higher interest rates. In an
environment with persistent high inflation however, this strategy was not without drawbacks.
More specifically, in the case of a bank failure, depositors in some instances had to wait for a
long time before they could get the full amount back, which meant an erosion of the real value
of the savings deposits.
It is, therefore, interesting to investigate the reasons underlying the way in which individuals
choose the banks they work with, especially when they have been exposed to incidents of bank
failures for some time. Understanding these reasons could be useful in two directions. First,
from a policymaker’s perspective, it may help developing a new deposit insurance scheme and
other banking sector regulations that are in line with individual choice. Second, from a bank’s
perspective, it may help developing a new marketing plan, new services, etc. Hence, the analyses
of the demand side of the banking sector, i.e. how consumers make their decisions on bank choice,
are of significance to policymakers and regulators as well as to bank decision makers who need
to identify their customer base so that they can design specific programs and services, and direct
their marketing effort accordingly.
Although there exists a vast literature on the supply side of the banking sector, i.e. how the
sector should be regulated, the structure of the market, costs, etc., the studies on the demand
side are limited in number. In an early descriptive study, Fry et al. (1973), using data from
a survey implemented on the 1961-1969 graduates of the University of Western Ontario and a
linear probability model for loyalty, find past patronage, patronage of parents, mobility, and
4For further details on the state of the Turkish banking system in the post 1980 era, see, for example, Alper
et al. (2001), Alper and Onis (2004), Damar (2004), and Denizer et al. (2000).
5Source: Bank Association of Turkey. http://www.tbb.org.tr
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gender, among other variables, significant for customers’ loyalty to their banks. In a similar
vein, Anderson et al. (1976) analyze the major factors that influence the choice of banks by
individuals using data from a survey that they designed and implemented in a southwestern
city in the U.S. Their analysis is based on individuals’ rankings of 15 bank selection criteria.
A cluster analysis is then performed to uncover customer typologies. The authors find that
friends’ recommendations, reputation, availability of credit, friendliness, and service charges on
checking accounts are the primary selection criteria. They conclude that convenience emerges
as the most important issue in this decision making process. Differentiating between banks and
finance companies, Bozcar (1978) uses data from a nation-wide survey in the U.S. in 1970 on
the socioeconomic characteristics of credit users and estimates a probit model to show that the
borrower profiles of these two types on institutions differ in terms of home ownership, credit
card ownership, age, education and race while the number of dependents, marital status, income
and gender do not seem to matter.
Employing more recent data and techniques, Dick (2002) and Adams et al. (2007) investigate
the demand for commercial bank deposits, and the willingness of consumers to substitute banks
for thrifts, respectively. Dick (2002) develops a demand model derived from consumer’s utility
maximization based on discrete choice analysis and also incorporates a model of the supply side
to account for the welfare effects of competition and policy. She uses data for the U.S. commercial
banks for the period 1993-1999, and finds that consumers respond to deposit rates and account
fees in choosing a depository institution. Customers also respond favorably to branch staffing,
geographic density, the age of the bank, the size of the bank, and geographic diversification.
Adams et al. (2007) use a panel data set that includes almost all banks and thrifts in the U.S.
for the period 1990-2001, and construct a discrete choice random utility model of consumer’s
choice of a depository institution. Their specification is different from that of Dick (2002) as they
estimate a non-hierarchical model as opposed to the nested model by Dick. Using the estimates
of choice parameters to calculate elasticities, they investigate the degree of substitutability of
thrifts for banks.
The present study is therefore an addition to the limited literature on the demand side of the
banking sector by specifically focusing on a developing country context. Moreover, it displays
a picture of how individuals choose banks in an economy which recently experienced a banking
crisis. A developing country context merits attention because it provides us with an environment
characterized by macroeconomic instability, persistent inflation and volatile exchange rates while
the banking sector is weakly supervised and under-regulated.
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The methodology used in this paper is similar to that of Bozcar (1978) due to data limitations.
Specifically, lack of price data and other variables defining the characteristics of banks prevents
us from using a methodology similar in spirit to Dick (2002) or Adams et al. (2007). However,
this issue is remedied by using individual level data on people’s perceptions about important
characteristics that banks should have. For example, our data set allows us to control for factors
that influence individual’s bank choice such as “the availability of friendly staff,” “the availability
of highest deposit rates,” etc. via dummy variables. Thus, we use a multinomial probit model
to differentiate among the likelihood of the choice of public banks, large private banks and small
private banks.
The paper uncovers that while individuals tend to choose small private banks on the basis of
high interest rates, they tend to avoid them on the basis of trust. The choice of public banks as
opposed to large private banks seems to have been positively influenced mostly by being older,
being retired, receiving salary/pension, and valuing special services for farmers and craftsmen
while it seems to have been negatively influenced by the use of certain services (i.e. saving
services such as deposit accounts or investment accounts, technology services such as internet
banking, and standard services such as bank cards or ATMs), valuing friendliness of the staff,
and living in more developed regions where there is variety in terms of the financial institutions.
Thus, it is possible to conclude that the choice of public versus large private banks mainly
depends on structural factors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data set. The
empirical framework and the results of the empirical analysis are presented in Section 3. Section
4 concludes.
2 The Data Set
The data used in this study were gathered by SAM Research and Consulting Inc. (Istanbul,
Turkey) in 2002. To ensure the representation of the target population at national level, stratified
multistage random sampling method is used. Target population is defined as the population older
than 18 years old, having an account in one bank, and living in an area where at least one bank
branch exists. The population living in places where no bank exists is left out for operational
reasons. Region and number of banks in the residential area are used as stratification criteria.
The questionnaires are implemented in nine regions, 84 districts of 23 cities. Accordingly, a
total of 1829 interviews are done. Fieldwork is accomplished during February 9-28, 2002. The
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variables used in this study are presented below.
2.1 The Dependent Variable
In the analysis that follows, banks are categorized into three groups: public banks, large private
banks, and small private banks.6 The divide between large private banks and small private
banks is based on the share of bank assets in the industry total. Those banks with a share of
assets in the industry total of 6% and higher are classified as large private banks. The average
of the share of assets in the industry total for the banks in the small private bank category is
around 1.3%. Public banks constitute about 40% of the sector in terms of assets.
Large private banks are kept separately from small private banks because they hold stronger
capital and are expected to be less risky. Such a categorization allows us to concentrate on the
differences in choices between public and private banks as well as large private banks versus
small private banks. See Table 1 for the distribution of bank choice across the sample.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
2.2 Potential Explanatory Variables
2.2.1 Demographics
Demographic characteristics include gender, age, education, income level, and occupation.
Education level is comprised of four dummy variables, namely no education (illiterate, literate
without degree), primary school (5-8 years), high school (11-13 years), and university (15 years
or more).
Seven dummies of income level refer to total monthly household income corresponding to
less than 175 YTL, 175 - 300 YTL, 301 - 500 YTL, 501 - 750 YTL, 751 - 1,000 YTL, 1,000 -
1,500 YTL, and more than 1,500 YTL. Note that the YTL/USD exchange rate at the time was
around 1.52 YTL/USD, which implies, for example, that 175 YTL approximately corresponds
to 115 USD, and 1,500 YTL is about 990 USD.
There are nine occupation categories.
• Manager/specialist: Manager / specialist in public or private sector / professor at univer-
sity; big trader, industry owner; professional with private practice; research assistant at
university
6Public banks include Halk Bank, Vakif Bank and Ziraat Bank while Is Bank, Akbank, Yapi Kredi and Garanti
are in large private banks. Small private banks category include all other private banks.
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• Civil servant (except directors/specialists/professors)
• Blue collar worker in public sector
• Blue collar worker in private sector
• Small trader: Craftsmen/small trader; farmer
• Retired
• Student
• Unemployed
• Other: Irregular work at home, irregular work outside the home, house wife, only living
on interest/rent income
2.2.2 Culture
Six questions addressing the frequency of participation in cultural activities are asked. These
include reading newspaper, going to cinema, going to theater, going to concerts, traveling and
reading books. Answers are taken on a Likert scale of four, such that “1-never”, “2-very seldom”,
“3-sometimes”, “4-regularly.”
These six questions are analyzed with Principle Components Analysis (PCA) in order to
characterize customers’ level of cultural consumption. As a result of the analysis a normalized
index is obtained. Although the variable is treated as a continuous variable in the estima-
tions, the range of the variable [-1.65, 2.74] is divided into four equal sub-ranges for descriptive
purposes.
Table 2 provides summary statistics related to the demographics in the sample.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
2.2.3 Banking services
Four variables that quantify service usage are as follows:
• Standard banking services: Bank card, ATM, credit card
• Saving services: Deposit account, investment account
• Credit services: Credit deposit account, commercial credit, consumer loan, housing loan
• Technology services: Automatic bill payment, telephone banking, internet banking, bank-
ing via TV, banking via WAP, POS machine
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These four variables indicate whether customers use these services or not.
Customers’ level of knowledge about banking services is also questioned. Individuals are
asked about ATM, credit card, bank card, teller machine (included separately for the ones who
are not familiar with the ATM abbreviation), telephone banking, internet banking, banking via
TV, banking via WAP, POS machine. Their knowledge is rated on a scale of 1 to 5 such that
“1” means “no idea,” and “5” means “know.”
These nine questions are used to obtain a general information level (index) on banking
services. This is accomplished by PCA. This variable is also treated as a continuous variable
in the estimations as in the case of culture. However, the range of the variable [-1.54, 3.22] is
divided into five equal sub-ranges for descriptive purposes.
Table 3 provides the distribution of culture and information variables across the sample.
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics on the usage of services and information level of customers.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
2.2.4 Important factors in banking
Respondents are also asked directly about the factors that influence their bank choice. These
factors are:
1. past patronage of other family members
2. the availability of full range of services that are needed
3. the best telephone banking service
4. the best internet banking service
5. the availability of special services for craftsmen and farmers
6. being the bank where salary/pension is deposited
7. being a state bank
8. the availability of close branches to home / work place / school
9. the most appropriate terms of credit
10. the highest interest rates on deposits
11. being the most trustworthy bank
12. friendly staff
13. one-to-one relationship with bank manager/customer representative
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The summary of these variables across the whole sample is presented in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
Based on the sample means reported in Table 4, the most important factors that influence
bank choice appear to be the bank where salary or pension is deposited, being trustworthy,
closeness of bank’s branches and having full range of services.
The respondents are also asked about their level of trust to the banking system in general.
A Likert scale of one to five is used, where 1 means “I do not trust at all” and 5 means “I trust
a lot.” This variable is also used as an explanatory variable for bank choice.
2.2.5 Region and branch density
Nine dummy variables are constructed to account for possible regional differences. These are
Mediterranean, Aegean, Southeast Anatolia, Black Sea, Northeast Anatolia, Marmara, Central
Eastern Anatolia, Central South Anatolia, and Central North Eastern Anatolia regions.
Moreover, there are five dummy variables which show the branch density: having 1-2, 3-5,
6-9, more than ten branches (excluding metropolitan areas), and metropolitan areas.
Table 5 provides summary statistics for location and density variables.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
3 Econometric Analysis
3.1 Econometric Framework
A standard multinomial probit model is constructed using bank choice as the dependent variable.
As described in Section 2.1, individual’s choice of banks are categorized into three types: public
banks, large private banks and small private banks. Thus, the multinomial probit model enables
one to express the probability of choosing each of these three types as a function of individual
characteristics such as demographics, banking services used, individual’s perception of important
factors in banking, location and branch density.
As mentioned earlier, the lack of price data and data on the characteristics of banks prevents
us from constructing a random utility model in a discrete choice framework and estimating
demand. However, our data set includes variables on individual’s perceptions of the important
characteristics of banks that influence their bank choice. Hence, we construct a multinomial
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probit model as where there are three alternatives, j = 1, 2, 3. Suppose that we label the alter-
natives such that j = 1 corresponds to public banks, j = 2 and j = 3 correspond to large private
banks and small private banks, respectively. Then, the probability that individual i chooses
public banks is given by:
pi1 = P (xiβ, ²i) (1)
pi2 and pi3 can also be obtained in a similar way. In equation (1), xi corresponds to the
individual characteristics, i.e. demographics, banking services used, individual’s perception of
important factors in banking, location and branch density. β is the vector of coefficients to be
estimated, and ²i is a 3 × 1 vector of error terms which are assumed to have a multivariate
Normal distribution in the multinomial probit model. Hence, P (·) is the multivariate normal
distribution function.
As mentioned above, xi corresponds to individual characteristics. Potential variables that
could be included in xi are described earlier in Section 2. Next, we will discuss how the variables
in xi are expected to affect the individual’s bank choice in the context of such an econometric
framework.
We do not have any a priori expectations as to how gender, age, education, income level,
culture level and whether the individual trusts in the entire banking sector influence the choice of
banks by individuals. Occupation, however, may have an influence. Specifically, almost all state
employees and all retirees receive their salaries and pensions from public banks. In addition,
certain public banks have specific services–usually in the form of extending a line of credit in
favorable terms–tailored to craftsmen, tradesmen or farmers. Thus, individuals that belong to
such occupations may choose to work with public banks.
In terms of the usage of banking services, it is expected that individuals would prefer private
banks when they are mostly using standard services or high-tech services. This is basically due
to the inability of public banks to deliver high quality in terms of standard services, e.g. the
wait lines might be too long, etc., because of their burden of the pension and salary payments
of a large number of state employees and retirees. In addition, again due to the same reason
and other inefficiencies, public banks might not be good at offering high-tech services. There
are, however, no a priori expectations about the effects of the usage of saving services or credit
services, and also of the level of knowledge about banking services on the choice of banks.
In this framework, it is also possible to form some expectations about how individuals’ per-
ceptions of important factors in banking might influence their choice. Although one cannot
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say much about the direction of the effects of past patronage of family members, the avail-
ability of full range of services, the best phone banking and internet banking services, and
having the most appropriate terms of credit on the choice of banks, valuing being a state bank–
obviously–increases the likelihood of choosing public banks. In addition, the state uses the public
banks to pay the salaries and pensions of its employees. If working with the bank from which
salary/pension is received is important for an individual, then the individual would be more
likely to be working with a public bank rather than a small private bank, which, in general,
may not indeed have widespread agreements with firms in terms of salary payments. Moreover,
Ziraat Bank, the largest among public banks, was specifically established to provide services for
farmers. Hence it is expected that if the availability of special services for craftsmen and farmers
is important, then the likelihood of choosing a public bank would be higher.
If individuals value closeness of the branches, they are expected to be less likely to choose
small private banks since these banks may have fewer branches. Conversely, for individuals who
value friendly staff and one-to-one relationship with bank manager/customer representative,
small private banks seem to be the likely choice as these banks try to form and maintain more
personal and informal relations with their customers. Moreover, individuals are expected to
have a tendency towards small private banks if they value having the highest interest rates on
deposits as these banks used to compete on the basis of interest rates only. But one may also
anticipate that the choice of small private banks decline with valuing the bank’s trustworthiness,
as such banks were perceived to be quite risky at the time.
In terms of the regional dummies, one can form expectations such that the Mediterranean,
Aegean, and Marmara regions would have a positive impact on the likelihood of private banks,
large or small. As these regional economies are relatively more developed than the rest of the
country, banking sector in these parts is also more developed. Hence private banks, which may
not even be serving in the other regions may have an important presence in the more developed
regions. In addition, it has been the policy of the state to open up a branch of Ziraat Bank,
the largest of public banks, in almost all townships. Hence, public banks have more widespread
branch networks than the private banks, and they are present even in those regions which lag
behind the rest of the country in terms of economic development. This increases their likelihood
of being chosen by individuals living in these regions.
Since this last point allows us to state that those regions that are more developed economi-
cally, banking sector in these regions is well developed as well, and thus, branch density is higher
in these regions. This implies that wherever there is higher branch density, the presence of pri-
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vate banks are more likely. Hence, higher branch density is expected to increase the likelihood
of private banks being chosen.
3.2 Results
As the meaning of the estimated coefficients of a probit model is hard to interpret in general,
marginal effects that show the effect of an infinitesimal increase on the probability of a choice
are reported in practice. Hence, Table 6 displays the marginal effects, which are calculated at
the sample averages for continuous variables and at 0 for dummy variables as a result of the
multinomial probit estimation.7 Thus, the coefficients in this table show how a small change in
one independent variable affects the probability of choosing each alternative. Column [1] in the
table corresponds to public banks, columns [2] and [3] correspond to large private banks and
small private banks, respectively.
[Insert Table 6 about here.]
The results indicate that gender, income level, education and culture level are not factors
that distinguish individuals with respect to their bank choice. However, it seems that older
people tend to choose public banks. Specifically, an increase in age by one year increases the
likelihood of choosing public banks by 0.6%.
Relative to managers and specialists, civil servants, blue collar workers in both the public
and the private sector, craftsmen and traders are more likely to choose public banks whereas
the retired and students are less likely to choose large private banks. Being retired raises the
probability of choosing public banks by almost 38% and lowers the probability of choosing large
private banks by 51%.8 Therefore, it is possible to conclude that certain types of occupations
indeed matter for bank choice. These results confirm our a priori expectations.
The usage of certain services seem to matter in bank choice. For example, individuals who
use saving services, technology services and standard services have more tendency to pick large
private banks and less tendency to pick public banks while the use of credit services raises the
likelihood of public banks and reduces the likelihood of large private banks, in line with our
expectations. These variables about the usage of services do not distinguish the choice of small
private banks from others. What is perhaps striking is that whether the individual trusts the
7The estimated probit coefficients are tabulated at the Appendix.
8Note that these effects are after controlling for whether an individual chooses a certain bank because he/she
receives salary/pension payments at that bank and whether the bank has special services for farmers and crafts-
men.
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entire banking sector or not and the individual’s information level about the banking services
are statistically insignificant in distinguishing between different alternatives.
The empirical evidence regarding the individuals’ perception of important factors in banking
can be summarized as follows:
• Family patronage seems to lower the probability of choosing small private banks.
• If the individual emphasizes the importance of having full range of services needed, the
likelihood of large private banks increases and reduces the likelihood of public banks. This
might probably be due to large private banks providing full range of services.
• Emphasis on salary/pension receipts and on having special services for farmers and crafts-
men increases the likelihood of public banks being chosen and reduces the likelihood of
large private banks.
• The importance of being a state bank seems to be a major factor in influencing bank choice.
If an individual values the state ownership of banks as important for his/her choice, his/her
probability of choosing a state bank by almost 49% after controlling for other independent
variables.
• Individuals do not base their bank choice decisions on the availability of phone banking
and internet banking.
• Emphasis on having the most appropriate terms of credit is not statistically significant.
However, this finding might be due to the presence of only a small number of customers
using credit services in the sample. Note that the market for household credits in Turkey
is quite underdeveloped and shallow; the household-credit-to-GDP ratio was around 9% in
2006 even after new regulations to encourage credit use were in place.9 Hence, individual’s
bank choice in Turkey is more likely to be based on the usage of saving services.
• Individuals who value having the highest interest rates are almost 12% more likely to
choose small private banks. This is an important result, especially because individuals
who consider trusting the bank being important are about 4% less likely to choose small
private banks. Hence, although people tend to avoid small private banks due to trust
related issues, they are also tempted to choose small private banks due to high interest
rates.
9For comparative purposes, note that household-credit-to-GDP ratio is around 17%, 18%, and 50% on average
in Central and Eastern European countries, emerging markets, and key European economies, respectively.
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• Trusting the bank also reduces the likelihood of public banks by almost 13% and increases
the likelihood of large private banks by almost 18%. This last result on trust and public
banks seems to be counter-intuitive because as public banks are “backed” by the state it
is natural to expect people who value trust to pick public banks. However, the results
indicate that public banks are only favored because of salary/pension receipts and special
services for craftsmen and farmers instead.
• Individuals who value the friendliness of the staff are more likely to choose large private
banks and less likely to choose public banks.
• Valuing closeness seems to be a factor reducing the likelihood of small private banks being
chosen, probably due to those banks having fewer branches.
• One-to-one relationships with the manager/customer representative seems to be a factor
that increases the likelihood of small private banks.
The results for the regional dummies indicate that people living in the more developed regions
such as Marmara, the Mediterranean, and the Aegean regions, are less likely to prefer public
banks, as expected. Moreover, the results related to the branch density dummies also confirm
these deductions. Compared to the metropolitan areas, people who live in areas where branch
density is lower are less likely to pick small private banks, probably due to those bank having no
branches in their area. Those people tend to be more likely to pick public banks, which almost
definitely have a branch in their neighborhood.
To sum up, the likelihood of choosing public banks seems to have been positively influenced
mostly by being older, being retired, receiving salary/pension, and valuing special services for
farmers and craftsmen while it seems to have been negatively influenced by the use of certain
services, valuing friendliness of the staff, and more developed regions where there is variety in
terms of the financial institutions. It is possible to say quite the opposite for large private banks.
The choice of small private banks is differentiated by branch density and closeness, and while
individuals tend to prefer small private banks on the basis of high interest rates, they tend to
avoid them on the basis of trust. It appears that small private banks managed to compensate
for their disadvantage in terms of low branch density and low level of trust by offering high
interest rates, and more personal relationships with the branch manager and staff.
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4 Conclusion
The Turkish banking sector during the period 1980-2001 was weakly supervised and under-
regulated, and financial liberalization attempts were still underway. The period was charac-
terized by a number of banking failures. Although full deposit insurance was in effect, in an
inflationary environment the value of money erodes during the time it takes for a depositor of
a failed bank to get his/her money back. Despite of this fact, during the time, a large number
of individuals nonetheless continued to work with smaller banks that carried potential risks.
Hence, the reasons underlying the way in which individuals choose the banks they work with
are interesting to investigate.
This paper analyzes the factors that influence individuals’ bank choice using a unique in-
dividual level data set from a nation-wide survey implemented in 2002. Due to lack of price
data and data on characteristics of banks, demand estimations derived from discrete choice ran-
dom utility models could not be not utilized, but rather a multinomial probit model for the
choice among three types of banks, namely public banks, large private banks, and small private
banks, is employed. The paper uncovers that while individuals tend to prefer small private
banks on the basis of high interest rates, they tend to avoid them on the basis of trust. The
choice of small private banks is adversely affected by branch density and closeness. In addition,
the likelihood of choosing public banks as opposed to large private banks seems to have been
positively influenced mostly by being older, being retired, receiving salary/pension, and valuing
special services for farmers and craftsmen while it seems to have been negatively influenced by
the use of certain services, valuing friendliness of the staff, and more developed regions where
there is variety in terms of the financial institutions. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the
choice of public versus large private banks mainly depends on structural factors. For instance,
state involvement in the banking sector in Turkey initially was in terms of establishing banks
for specific purposes: agricultural credits, housing credits, credits for tradesmen and craftsmen,
etc. Later the operations of those banks exceeded the original intention. In addition, most state
employees receive salaries and all retirees receive pensions from state banks.
These results could be useful in two directions. First, policymakers and regulators could
develop new regulations that are in accordance with individual choice. Specifically, deposit
insurance schemes induce moral hazard on the part of those customers who are unwilling to un-
dertake a meticulous search for the reliability of banks. Hence, it might be possible to formulate
policies that regulate banks to disclose more information about themselves to customers in order
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to somewhat force the customers to compare and contrast on the basis of trust, etc., i.e. to have
them make a well-informed decision. Second, making it possible for the bank decision makers to
identify their customer base, the results could help banks design specific programs and services.
For example, it appears that the divide between public banks and large private banks from the
viewpoint of the customers is more of a structural issue, as mentioned above. In this respect,
engaging in deals with firms for salary payments or offering specific terms of credit for certain
types of individuals could be beneficial. In addition, more personalized relationships with the
branch manager and staff seem to be another factor that can be emphasized in this respect.
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Bank choice Frequency Percent
Public 700 38.27
Large 973 53.2
Small 156 8.53
Total 1829 100
Table 1: Distribution of bank choice in the sample.
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Variable Range Obs Mean Std.Dev.
Gender 1=Female, 2=Male 1829 1.748 0.434
Age 18+ 1829 37.063 12.942
Income (<175) 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.086 0.280
Income (175 - 300) 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.250 0.433
Income (301 - 500) 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.285 0.451
Income (501 - 750) 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.179 0.383
Income (751 - 1000) 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.095 0.293
Income (1000 - 1500) 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.045 0.207
Income (>1500) 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.027 0.163
No education 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.024 0.153
Primary school 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.393 0.489
High school 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.284 0.451
University 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.299 0.458
Manager/specialist 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.036 0.187
Civil servant 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.117 0.322
Blue collar - public 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.041 0.198
Blue collar - private 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.169 0.375
Craftsmen/trader 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.197 0.398
Retired 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.169 0.375
Student 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.095 0.293
Unemployed 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.062 0.242
Employment - other 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.113 0.317
Culture/social participation [-1.65,2.74] 1820 0.000 1.000
Table 2: Summary statistics. Demographic indicators.
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Culture Frequency Percent
Lowest 640 35.16
Low 604 33.2
High 470 25.82
Highest 106 5.82
Total 1820 100
Information Frequency Percent
Nothing 538 30.28
Little 708 39.84
Somewhat 335 18.85
Well 148 8.33
Very well 48 2.7
Total 1777 100
Table 3: Distribution of culture/social participation and infor-
mation level about banking services in the sample.
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Variable Range Obs Mean Std.Dev.
Trust banking sector 1=Yes, 0=No 1651 2.462 1.083
Information level about services [-1.54,3.22] 1777 0.000 1.000
Use of saving services 1=Use, 0=Not use 1829 0.426 0.495
Use of credit services 1=Use, 0=Not use 1829 0.126 0.332
Use of technology services 1=Use, 0=Not use 1829 0.128 0.334
Use of standard services 1=Use, 0=Not use 1829 0.846 0.361
Family patronage 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.176 0.381
Full range of services 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.201 0.401
Telephone banking 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.037 0.189
Internet banking 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.036 0.187
Salary/pension receipts 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.320 0.467
Services for farmers and craftsmen 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.066 0.249
Terms of credit 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.060 0.237
State 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.172 0.377
Closeness 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.221 0.415
Interest rates 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.047 0.212
Trust the bank 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.231 0.421
Staff 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.186 0.389
Manager 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.087 0.282
Table 4: Summary statistics. Important factors in banking.
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Variable Range Obs Mean Std.Dev.
Mediterranean 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.125 0.331
Aegean 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.148 0.355
Southeastern 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.056 0.230
Black Sea 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.063 0.244
Northeastern 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.025 0.155
Marmara 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.323 0.468
Central eastern 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.048 0.213
Central south 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.064 0.245
Central north 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.148 0.355
Branch density 1-2 branches 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.100 0.299
Branch density 3-5 branches 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.099 0.299
Branch density 6-9 branches 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.092 0.289
Branch density >10 branches (excl. metropolitan) 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.347 0.476
Branch density — metropolitan 1=Yes, 0=No 1829 0.362 0.481
Table 5: Summary statistics. Location and branch density.
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Variable [1] [2] [3]
Gender 0.006 (0.040) -0.030 (0.040) 0.024 (0.019)
Age 0.006*** (0.002) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.001* (0.001)
Income (175 - 300) 0.057 (0.051) -0.043 (0.052) -0.014 (0.022)
Income (301 - 500) 0.039 (0.049) -0.023 (0.049) -0.016 (0.021)
Income (501 - 750) -0.015 (0.056) 0.054 (0.056) -0.038** (0.019)
Income (751 - 1000) -0.025 (0.068) 0.046 (0.068) -0.021 (0.024)
Income (1000 - 1500) 0.014 (0.087) -0.026 (0.085) 0.013 (0.039)
Income (>1500) -0.075 (0.092) 0.093 (0.093) -0.018 (0.035)
Primary school -0.046 (0.104) -0.043 (0.121) 0.090 (0.073)
High school -0.089 (0.104) -0.011 (0.127) 0.100 (0.087)
University 0.006 (0.117) -0.066 (0.130) 0.060 (0.078)
Civil servant -0.123 (0.098) -0.167 (0.113) 0.290** (0.142)
Blue collar - public -0.164 (0.102) -0.143 (0.139) 0.306* (0.171)
Blue collar - private -0.115 (0.098) -0.088 (0.110) 0.203* (0.119)
Craftsmen/trader 0.034 (0.111) -0.239** (0.100) 0.205* (0.113)
Retired 0.382*** (0.116) -0.511*** (0.072) 0.128 (0.109)
Student 0.196 (0.125) -0.305*** (0.100) 0.109 (0.109)
Unemployed -0.057 (0.118) -0.172 (0.120) 0.229 (0.148)
Employment - other 0.043 (0.134) -0.397*** (0.092) 0.354** (0.158)
Culture/social participation -0.021 (0.021) 0.025 (0.020) -0.004 (0.008)
Trust banking sector -0.015 (0.014) 0.012 (0.014) 0.003 (0.006)
Information level about services 0.024 (0.021) -0.030 (0.020) 0.006 (0.009)
Use of saving services -0.073** (0.033) 0.069** (0.033) 0.005 (0.015)
Use of credit services 0.079* (0.048) -0.099** (0.047) 0.020 (0.023)
Use of technology services -0.219*** (0.045) 0.199*** (0.047) 0.020 (0.024)
Use of standard services -0.114** (0.047) 0.124*** (0.046) -0.010 (0.021)
Family patronage -0.039 (0.040) 0.065 (0.040) -0.025* (0.015)
Full range of services -0.159*** (0.039) 0.146*** (0.040) 0.013 (0.019)
Telephone banking 0.109 (0.118) -0.074 (0.113) -0.036 (0.025)
Internet banking -0.157 (0.107) 0.120 (0.104) 0.037 (0.054)
Salary/pension receipts 0.208*** (0.042) -0.176*** (0.041) -0.031* (0.017)
Services for farmers and craftsmen 0.231*** (0.064) -0.270*** (0.059) 0.039 (0.035)
Terms of credit -0.111 (0.069) 0.101 (0.068) 0.010 (0.030)
State 0.488*** (0.038) -0.409*** (0.038) -0.080*** (0.010)
Closeness -0.008 (0.039) 0.038 (0.039) -0.031** (0.014)
Interest rates -0.028 (0.082) -0.096 (0.080) 0.124** (0.053)
Trust the bank -0.134*** (0.038) 0.177*** (0.037) -0.042*** (0.014)
Staff -0.090** (0.044) 0.086** (0.044) 0.004 (0.017)
Manager -0.033 (0.057) -0.064 (0.058) 0.096** (0.038)
Mediterranean -0.177*** (0.051) 0.050 (0.062) 0.126** (0.054)
Aegean -0.146*** (0.050) 0.135** (0.054) 0.011 (0.030)
Southeastern -0.013 (0.081) -0.095 (0.084) 0.107 (0.074)
Black Sea -0.079 (0.059) 0.079 (0.064) 0.000 (0.036)
Northeastern -0.010 (0.115) -0.036 (0.116) 0.046 (0.078)
Marmara -0.229*** (0.041) 0.173*** (0.045) 0.056** (0.028)
Central eastern -0.039 (0.079) -0.026 (0.085) 0.065 (0.064)
Central south -0.136** (0.056) 0.022 (0.070) 0.114* (0.062)
Branch density 1-2 branches 0.365*** (0.058) -0.325*** (0.055) -0.040** (0.016)
Branch density 3-5 branches 0.086 (0.065) -0.047 (0.063) -0.039* (0.020)
Branch density 6-9 branches 0.136** (0.066) -0.061 (0.066) -0.076*** (0.010)
Branch density >10 branches 0.038 (0.043) 0.003 (0.043) -0.041** (0.018)
(excl. metropolitan)
Log pseudolikelihood -982.61 No. Obs. 1602 Wald χ2102 624.45
Table 6: Marginal effects (computed at sample averages for continuous variables, at 0 for dummy variables).
[1], [2], and [3] denote public, large private, and small private banks, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
*,**, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Variable [2/1] Large private banks [3/1] Small private banks
Gender -0.062 (0.152) 0.199 (0.204)
Age -0.022*** (0.007) -0.026*** (0.009)
Income (175 - 300) -0.197 (0.192) -0.248 (0.252)
Income (301 - 500) -0.123 (0.183) -0.234 (0.241)
Income (501 - 750) 0.121 (0.216) -0.364 (0.295)
Income (751 - 1000) 0.132 (0.264) -0.152 (0.330)
Income (1000 - 1500) -0.074 (0.324) 0.074 (0.393)
Income (>1500) 0.331 (0.382) 0.004 (0.499)
Primary school 0.036 (0.420) 0.796 (0.562)
High school 0.194 (0.437) 0.906 (0.581)
University -0.122 (0.458) 0.440 (0.615)
Civil servant 0.028 (0.379) 1.588*** (0.617)
Blue collar - public 0.213 (0.456) 1.677** (0.688)
Blue collar - private 0.145 (0.389) 1.352** (0.613)
Craftsmen/trader -0.507 (0.378) 1.021* (0.594)
Retired -1.885*** (0.389) 0.067 (0.645)
Student -0.980** (0.410) 0.265 (0.640)
Unemployed -0.167 (0.428) 1.180* (0.652)
Employment - other -0.940** (0.410) 1.322** (0.637)
Culture/social participation 0.089 (0.078) 0.018 (0.096)
Trust sector 0.054 (0.052) 0.061 (0.069)
Information level about services -0.103 (0.079) -0.001 (0.098)
Use of saving services 0.279** (0.126) 0.207 (0.161)
Use of credit services -0.335* (0.176) -0.011 (0.218)
Use of technology services 0.935*** (0.237) 0.787*** (0.269)
Use of standard services 0.452*** (0.169) 0.156 (0.215)
Family patronage 0.195 (0.158) -0.152 (0.200)
Full range of services 0.638*** (0.174) 0.515** (0.210)
Telephone banking -0.350 (0.419) -0.629 (0.488)
Internet banking 0.621 (0.517) 0.704 (0.575)
Salary/pension receipts -0.740*** (0.157) -0.741*** (0.209)
Services for farmers and craftsmen -0.959*** (0.235) -0.159 (0.277)
Terms of credit 0.441 (0.302) 0.366 (0.346)
State -1.750*** (0.172) -2.110*** (0.289)
Closeness 0.079 (0.148) -0.280 (0.184)
Interest rates -0.097 (0.323) 0.754** (0.335)
Trust the bank 0.612*** (0.159) -0.096 (0.216)
Staff 0.356** (0.179) 0.251 (0.205)
Manager -0.029 (0.223) 0.667*** (0.257)
Mediterranean 0.561** (0.236) 1.227*** (0.326)
Aegean 0.591*** (0.225) 0.469 (0.303)
Southeastern -0.131 (0.303) 0.656 (0.415)
Black Sea 0.319 (0.247) 0.192 (0.378)
Northeastern -0.038 (0.436) 0.343 (0.594)
Marmara 0.867*** (0.184) 1.029*** (0.259)
Central eastern 0.050 (0.309) 0.519 (0.436)
Central south 0.396 (0.254) 1.022*** (0.358)
Branch density 1-2 branches -1.311*** (0.230) -1.134*** (0.289)
Branch density 3-5 branches -0.261 (0.233) -0.615* (0.339)
Branch density 6-9 branches -0.382 (0.237) -1.538*** (0.417)
Branch density >10 branches -0.081 (0.162) -0.474** (0.220)
(excl. metropolitan)
Constant 1.155 (0.752) -2.140** (1.069)
Table 7: Probit coefficients. Base category: Public banks. Standard errors in parentheses. *,**, and ***
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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